

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

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The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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ABSTRACT

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Ukraine is a very young independent state in the post Soviet space with a many centuries-old history. Its foreign policy and national strategy were not definitely clear and precise during the 1990s. Ukrainian foreign policy and strategy had a lot of mistakes, problems and misunderstandings. With such a favorable and unique geopolitical position in Europe, it could play a more important role in the European and world system of safety. During the last two months of 2004, the Ukrainian people made a new choice in the direction of democracy, protection of human rights and the European (western) orientation. They rejected principles of corruption and infringement of freedom and human rights, which were inherent to the old regime. Events on September 11, 2001 have forced all the world to shudder before the threat of world terrorism and to be united in a struggle against this evil. The purpose of this paper is to examine the emergence of a clear Ukrainian geo-political strategy and argues for the strategic logic of a continuing US-Ukraine partnership in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the West's policy toward Ukraine during the years preceding Operation "Iraqi Freedom". All of those factors, advantages and disadvantages directly or indirectly have enabled Ukraine to participate as a friendly, non-NATO country in this operation. The participation of Ukraine in this operation became one more acknowledgement of Ukraine's commitment to world democratic values, its obligations to world society and an attribution of good will of all Ukrainian people in the struggle against terrorism.

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GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Vast and fearsome as the human scene has become, personal contacts of the right people, in the right places, at the right time, may yet have a potent and valuable part to play in the cause of peace which is in our hearts.

--Winston Churchill

This paper examines the emergence of a clear Ukrainian geo-political strategy and argues for the strategic logic of a continuing US-Ukraine partnership in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the West's policy toward Ukraine during the years preceding Operation "Iraqi Freedom". All of those factors, advantages and disadvantages directly or indirectly have enabled Ukraine to participate as a friendly, non-NATO country in this operation.

During all the years of its existence Ukraine has never had a clearly defined geopolitical strategy to support its own policy. Nevertheless, the development of such a strategy is a vital necessity for Ukraine, both as a sovereign country and as an aspiring power on the geopolitical map. The geopolitical potential and possibilities of Ukraine derive from its status as a Central European state with a very specific location – centered between Europe and Eurasia.

The basis for the formation of such a strategy is a clear definition of basic values and national interests, of internal and external development, and of geopolitical orientations for the future. The preliminary development of these crucial categories, together with an analysis of the main directions and aims of the strategies and goals of Ukraine's partners in the international arena as outlined above, allows for the elaboration of Ukraine's geopolitical and foreign policy priorities.

The possibility of direct interaction with other world regions and powers constitutes the main benefit derived from the achievement of independence. Ukraine has attained a new quality of political and institutional life, become the subject of international efforts and participates in world processes as a member of the UN. A clear articulation of our national interests demanded, first of all, the formation of our own system of orientation within the geopolitical world model. The state coordinates policy and positions, taking into account the interests and positions of other states.

Unfortunately, Ukraine, historically, has interacted with the world mainly through conciliators and by means of a more politically developed foreign consciousness (Russian, Polish, etc). Ukraine today stands on the threshold of opening to the world on its own behalf, a process that Europe has been developing for several centuries. Ukraine has remained a geopolitical terra incognita to the world for many years. Only the last Presidential election in

Ukraine, during November-December 2004, really attracted the attention of world society to Ukraine, and each state recognized Ukraine again as a sovereign and important country. "The people and the State have sustained a very uneasy and hard test for its maturity and viability"¹.

The process of Ukraine's gaining real independence and its entry into the international community has created a fundamentally new situation for development of the Ukrainian nation. The new quality of Ukrainian society demands a corresponding reappraisal of its own values. This re-evaluation has to begin with the almost complete reorientation of the state system based upon the awareness, mentality and distinctiveness of the Ukrainian people.

The aspiration for direct contact with other countries demands an independent comprehension of other structures of consciousness, which determine the actions of influential political and economic powers. Penetration into the outside world begins with attempts at understanding it, with establishing contacts with it and with an entry into multilateral dialog. Only then will we be able to find those forms for the presentation of our national identity and interests that are understandable to the outside world. Ukraine had no system of collective security. It was necessary to reconsider for a long time a question of Ukrainian status to be neutral, outside any block in the collective global security system.

UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTIONS

Ukraine, during all its history as well as during the time of independence has gone its own way. There are three current foreign political directions which could define Ukraine's geostrategy : the *Eurasian* (Russia and the CIS), the *Euro-Atlantic* (European and USA) and the *South-Eastern* direction. They all have deep historical roots and are determined by a number of geopolitical factors. This confirms their objectivity and importance for the existence of the country. They are traditional for the political life of Ukraine. The determination of adversaries and partners has been the first action Ukraine has had to take each time it has obtained the possibility of going its own way. After acquisition of independence, Ukraine should once again express itself in the world.

In regard to the Eurasian orientation, it is obvious that the geopolitical situation of Ukraine demands the creation of a balanced system of good-neighborly relations, first of all with its northern neighbor, Russia - the main provider of natural gas and oil on which Ukraine is very dependent. The intention to develop stronger relations with Russia than with other countries, perhaps excepting Poland, and the possibility for second place in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during the last several years were interpreted by the West as a very unclear policy. All this might cause more isolation of Ukraine from the West.

Regardless of numerous difficulties, Ukrainians never parted with the idea of their own independent state. The concept that Ukraine has a common destiny with Russia is no longer fashionable. According to recent data, "only 28% of the population of Ukraine considers a return to a political union with Russia a viable option. At the same time, the number of adherents believing in a European oriented Ukraine is growing- steadily today measuring more than 46 % support".² However, it is not necessarily easy for Ukraine to proceed in this direction. Russia has exercised enormous economic pressure on Ukraine, mainly through various trade wars which violate the free trade agreement signed in 2001 between the two countries. "Of course we want good relations with Russia, but there is a clear consensus in Ukraine today that our development must be linked to European structures," said Volodymyr Lytvyn, Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, in an interview with the Washington Times. "No other alternative is even being considered."³

In terms of the South-East direction, Ukraine has again shown a multi-vector policy. Historically, Ukraine had good relations with Caucasian and Central Asian countries such as Georgia, Armenia and Uzbekistan. Through the establishment of a new political grouping within post-Soviet territory - GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Ukraine increased its distance from Moscow. Desiring to be more independent in terms of natural resources has led Ukraine to establish strong relations with those countries, in order to provide new joint oil and gas pipelines through Ukraine to Europe. Using all state capabilities, and taking into account its geo-strategic location, served to raise relations with the West and Europe again. However, despite the fact that Ukraine has built the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline alone, the oil did not begin to flow on the scheduled date. In the beginning, only Poland supported this project to provide oil and gas not only to Ukraine and Poland, but to the EU as well. Not only Western countries, but Russia as well, used their full influence to disturb this process. Ukraine has seen one more time that such a strategic goal can be reached only with associate countries (friends) and with consideration given to regional stability not only in the Caucasian region, but in a wider area as well. As Secretary of State Powell made clear in his interview with the Ukrainian weekly newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli on July 7, 2001 - "We have always supported GUUAM, just as we supported any other voluntary association of states based on common interest. But only the members of GUUAM themselves can ensure the organization's success."⁴

Only when relations between the US and Ukraine got warmer in 2003 did the Bush Administration make the decision to support the Odessa–Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline project.

The Euro-Atlantic direction was more painful for Ukraine. During more than ten years of independence, Ukraine has demonstrated many times to Europe and the USA its own aspiration to become part of the European family of nations. By creating a really democratic country, based on the principles of democracy, freedom and human rights, the government might confirm the intent of all people and its ability to continue national foreign policy in the right direction. Ukraine voluntarily divested itself of WMD, established a new Constitution which declared Ukraine neutral and took other steps to present a more democratic face. All those factors performed a quite positive role in relations with Western states. Although Ukraine is a Central European state, it has a definite range of interests outside of this region. Therefore, the strategic goal of Ukraine - comprehensive integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures-should in no way exclude the possibilities for a thorough development of economic, political and socio-cultural relations with other regions of the world.

For many years, in its relations with the West, Ukraine did not have a clear and defined long-term policy, which resulted in rocking back and forth between the West and Moscow. All of this is the result of the long-term communist impact and the continued presence of former communist leaders in the highest echelons of state power. Moreover, most of Europe, the EU and the West, except some countries, first of all the USA and Poland, have never had a direct and attractive policy to deepen Ukrainian involvement in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. By following its national interests, obeying its own obligations to world society and making use of its unique geopolitical location in Europe, Ukraine might have played its role in terms of European-South-East regional security earlier. Despite having European roots, Ukraine has historically emerged on the frontier of the collision with nomadic cultures and is still often regarded as the zone of struggle for domination between two superpowers.

FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

The main geopolitical and foreign policy priorities of Ukraine are:

- the survival of Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation; the strengthening of the fundamental values and institutions that ensure prosperity, security, socio-cultural progress;
- the return of Ukraine into the European community of states through a multifaceted integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, social and security structures;
- the strengthening of economic and political potential and Ukraine's "capability", including the intensification of internal development, participation in European security

structures, and conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties, along with the receipt of corresponding assurances and security guarantees, etc.;

- the priority of an orientation toward integration into the EU; the enhancement of a distinctive partnership with NATO, including as a first phase a course toward joining the political structures of this organization, as a cornerstone of European security;
- the strengthening of a strategic partnership with the USA and ties with western European countries, in correspondence with the national interests and priorities of Ukraine.⁵

Taking into account the latest developments in Ukraine after its presidential elections, today one of the most important Ukrainian state-building tasks is the development of a consistent national strategy for the future, according to new geopolitical and foreign policy priorities. The geopolitical dilemma can only be resolved in one manner: a return to the European community as a full-fledged subject of Euro-Atlantic geopolitics.

Lately, there have been many signs of reduced tensions in relations between Ukraine and the West. Ukraine aspired to the status of a country with a market economy and proposed a bilateral protocol with the US about future entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). For a long time the US and the West refused all those intentions. The severe limitation on free mass media, the murder of the independent journalist Giorgi Gongadze, the strengthening position of autocratic government and the "Kolchuga" scandal played not a small role in this tension. But in spite of differences of opinions between the West and Ukraine, Ukraine's President and main leaders continued to visit Western countries in order to insure that we solve most of our internal problems very quickly. President Leonid Kuchma visited several European countries and his subsequent statements eased the anxiety of the West. The best evidence of this was President George W. Bush's statements at Göteborg and the Warsaw Summit in 2001 stating that Europe should not forget about Ukraine and that he didn't see the future of a Ukraine outside of Europe. In the final document of the EU Summit in Göteborg, Ukraine was listed in the "Future of Europe" section, unlike Russia, which was relegated to "External Relations." The statements made by the President of Sweden and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the latest visit of the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn to the United States, proved that the West is seriously concerned about Ukraine's destiny. It is a nation "struggling with the trauma of transition [and] we must extend our hand to Ukraine - as Poland has already done with such determination." ⁶ But Ukrainian will alone is not enough. Ukraine, with a fair degree of confidence, has to state that its legacy, especially the low standards of living in Ukraine, must

be adjusted in accordance with EU requirements. To complete this main objective Ukraine needs to apply the efforts of the authorities as well as all society.

Ukraine's strongest external partner is its closest western neighbor, Poland, not only on the regional but also on the strategic level. Poland pursued a very ambitious path and the effort was not in vain. Poland was one of the first post-communist countries to join NATO and the EU. In this context the Polish model might be optimal for Ukraine. At the same time that Poland was enjoying significant support from the West, Ukrainians were facing profound structural economic and social challenges, all the while struggling to resolve issues concerning its national identity.

But it would be obviously impossible to imagine the growth of Poland without active US support, and if the United States had not encouraged Poland's creditors to write off its multibillion dollar external debt over ten years ago this growth may not have been possible. During the first term of President George W. Bush, it took several years for his administration to submit new approaches toward the future of Ukraine.

In spite of many historical contradictions and misunderstanding between Poland and Ukraine, and the lack of clear Ukrainian policy, Polish authorities every time have supported Ukraine in its movement to attain more democratic values. Their presidents have established very good relations and the Polish nation also serves as a prime example of what is possible when democratic and market reforms are implemented with the utmost resolve. The President of Poland has been unflinching in his efforts to support Ukraine in moving towards the European model.

Many changes occurred in Ukraine during the last two months of the year 2004. The previously tolerated regime attempted to keep power through a fraudulent presidential election. When it was clear, however, that the people had been cheated, the Ukrainian people took to the streets to demand democracy. For the first time within post-Soviet countries, the majority of Ukrainians made their choice-for democracy and prosperity. Ukraine actually stood close to the collapse of the country or even civil war, but thankfully nothing happened. The people forced a new election, and in a fair repeat election, the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko won easily. The President of Poland was the first who proposed help to Ukraine in order to solve the political crisis. All European society and the US stood up to defend democracy and truth in Ukraine. Before the last presidential election, for many countries in the world Ukraine was really an unknown country, like terra-incognita, but after only two months the world knows and recognizes the new Ukraine. "Relations between Poland and Ukraine are somewhat more than just relations between strategic partners. I would say that they are warmer – truly friendly. We are concerned for each other. We are always ready to support each other in difficult times and

share joy in happy ones.”⁷ Of course, Poland and Ukraine also have a history of difficult relations.

Europe has seen again how unstable its regional security might be, especially on its eastern borders. Moreover, it is very important that the US has come to recognize Ukraine's significance, not only as an instrumental player in maintaining regional stability, but for its potential impact upon the further advancement of democracy and free market economics throughout Eurasia. The new Ukrainian President and Ukrainian society have made their choice to be a part of the free, democratic European family, based on the rights of equality and reciprocal respect. Today is very important for Ukrainian national policy in relations with EU – do not run ahead, do not make hasty statements, do not give ungrounded promises and do not put forward whatever is demanded.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

I believe that the US Government, as well as American democratic society, want to see Ukraine as a stable, independent, democratic, economically prosperous country. By helping Ukraine to realize this vision, the US will enhance its own national interests. Ukraine wants and will maintain positive and beneficial relations with its neighbors and actively contribute to strengthening peace and security in the international community, where Ukraine might have played a serious role much earlier as a geopolitical partner. This is not only true for Ukrainian national interests, but for American and European interests as well.

Today is really a new historical period and opportunity which the US and Europe must not let pass. It is very important that the US and Ukraine act now, when the experiences of Poland are still fresh, in order to move Ukraine into the orbit of Europe and towards Western democracy and free market economics. Putting forth an action plan to help Ukraine achieve political, economic, and social mobility would serve not only regional democracy, but could be one of the greatest US achievements in Europe. The triangle of US – Poland - Ukraine relations might serve both strategic and practical purposes by making the region more secure and by making Ukraine more prosperous and self sufficient. The US and Poland have a mutual interest to help Ukraine build its civil society. Poland's achievements in this area would help it to serve as a role model for Ukraine.

The experience of a Ukrainian-Polish battalion serving in the American sector in Kosovo (US brigade “Center”) is just one vivid example of this trilateral cooperation. There is another opportunity awaiting where our trilateral strategic vision could be realized again. Making Ukraine the country of choice for the transit of Caspian Sea oil to Europe is one such area. After the

presidential elections in Ukraine, it is very important for the US to support President Yushchenko's effort to stay on the European track.

The American and Polish presidents have established excellent relations. The Presidents of Ukraine and Poland have had such a relationship for a long time. Now it is time to bring all three players together to act as a team. "In this way Poland hopes to become a gate and bridge, and not a closed door towards the East, first of all the Ukraine". ⁸

Integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures remains the most powerful stimulus for democratic and economic reforms in Ukraine and this is also a powerful mechanism to establish a new strategy to achieve this goal. An important step in the practical realization of full-scale integration into those structures was the decision of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council of May 23, 2002. According to this decision, joining NATO, which is the basis of the all-European security system, is the final goal of the policy of Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

"After becoming a NATO member, Ukraine will be able to ensure more effectively the security in the strategically important Northern Black Sea region, the importance of which for Europe and America has been increasing from year both due to its energy and transport significance and role in enhancing regional security and stability". ⁹

One of the most important current examples of American-Ukrainian cooperation is the Ukrainian participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It was another test for both countries capabilities to not only improve relations but to demonstrate Ukrainian readiness to integrate into the West.

UKRAINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN IRAQ

Today we live in a very unsafe and constantly changing world. Understanding this, the personal contribution of each country in the war against world terrorism assumes special significance. No state or continent in the world is safe from attack and threats from terrorists. The events of September 11, 2001 in the USA made clear to the entire world the global threat of terrorism. Moreover, it was not only a problem for the USA or several countries; it is a problem for the entire world. "Like the end of Cold War, September 11 was one of the relatively rare earthquakes that cause lasting tectonic shifts in international politics". ¹⁰

What happened in Ukraine after September 11, 2001? It was the first time Ukraine clearly understood that terrorists acts might occur in any part of Ukraine. All the world saw that world terrorism has declared war against world society. According to our Constitution, Ukraine is a neutral country. We have reduced and completely destroyed our nuclear armaments, thus

demonstrating to the world our status as a neutral country. But current events indicate that Ukraine cannot escape the world threat of terrorism. This realization led to Ukrainian participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Like other nations Ukraine also had to make some personal commitment and contributions to maintain peace and security in the world, especially in the Middle East. The nearness of Iraq to Ukraine and to the South Black Sea region has also played a big role in the process. Ukraine would like to stay in the US-Poland-Ukraine triangle as well. It was really very helpful for the Ukrainian Government when the US proposed that Poland lead the Multinational Division in Iraq. These actions were nicely correlated with our strategic interests and values.

During the 1990s Russia conducted two military combat campaigns against Chechen terrorists and international mercenaries. Ukraine at that time had not recognized Russian aggressions against the Chechen people, because it feared a break in diplomatic relations. Chechnya was seen as an internal Russian problem. Although by then it was already obvious, that was the beginning of the war against world terrorism. The latest bloody event in Beslan, Russia is clear confirmation of this.

This decision has not been easy for the Ukrainian government or for the Ukrainian community. Public opinion polls were carried out by Razumkov Centre Sociological Service from February 27 to March 5, 2003 in all regions of Ukraine. "When asked whether they would support military action on the part of the US against Iraq, 4.6% said they would support such action, 90.5% said they would oppose it, and 4.9% were unsure."¹¹

First, American efforts were and will be directed to establishing and strengthening democracy in Iraq, which was disrupted during Saddam Hussein's regime. Beyond that, there will be a serious effort to strengthen safety and security in the explosive Middle East. There is a real possibility to create a flourishing democratic country in Iraq, given its rich natural resources. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not require participation in OIF from all allies or friends. He proposed to introduce feasible individual contributions, depending on the potential possibilities of each country. This proposal was well received by the world community but not all US allies inside NATO agreed. Germany, France and some other NATO countries were against the use of force against Iraq. Any equivocation by European countries is partly motivated by concern that they will become terrorist targets if they support excessive military retaliation. Ukraine had the same concern especially because Chechnya is located only 500 km. from its south-east border. Many Americans have argued that the US has supported European allies for many years and in its time of need the US did not want their support, which might undermine

NATO and America's commitment to Europe. This could be a moment of truth for the alliance and the intensity of emotion among Americans runs deep.

The UN once again showed its limits as the coordinating body of the global security system. The conflict demonstrated a gap between the ambitions of the UN to police the world and its problems with enforcement of its resolutions. The UN has also often been unable to come to a decision about enforcement, let alone take action against violators, without the support of the US, and this war has become yet another demonstration of this problem.

"Other nations had the will to face terror, though not the means to participate in operations. Every instance of support, from every country – no matter how small or large – is helping to win this war, and every one is valued".¹² Ukraine was one of the first non- NATO countries to support the US in the fight against terrorism.

There have also been clear short-term benefits for Ukraine. First of all, its relationship with the US has improved noticeably in comparison with the last several years. Relations with Poland have improved as well. The Ukraine - U.S. cooperation in Iraq began with the deployment of the Ukrainian Chemical-Biological-Radiological protection battalion to Kuwait during the active hostilities period of March-April 2003. The battalion dispatched also in accordance with the request of the Kuwaitis. The Supreme Council of Ukraine ratified the relevant agreement with Kuwait. This agreement straightforwardly regulated the legal status, as well as the purpose and condition of its deployment. Its task was solely to protect civilians against the aftermath of the use of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of Kuwait. Besides, under no circumstances would the Ukrainian contingent take part in hostilities. "The dispatch of our battalion into Kuwait was the indication of our civilization, faithful to the generally accepted world values, although it spite it was not so easy".¹³

The battalion was deployed by Ukrainian airplanes to Kuwait just 2 weeks after hostilities began. This first deployment to the zone of hostilities near the Iraqi border proved several things. The problem of the individual equipment of Ukrainian personnel remained, and the United States again provided support on the spot with some basic equipment including uniforms, protection gear, and footwear. But there was no doubt about the professionalism of Ukrainian personnel and the readiness of their combat equipment. In addition, the Ukrainians were located at the same base as the Americans, which added once again to their knowledge and appreciation of each other.

The fact that Ukraine contributed military forces to the US-led coalition (an NBC protection battalion to Kuwait during the war, as well as a brigade to the stabilization force later on) demonstrated that Ukraine could play a more substantive role in international relations. This

gave substance to many previously empty declarations like “strategic partnership between Ukraine and the US”. If one sets aside political speculation about personal benefits for President Kuchma, it is noteworthy that the decision to contribute was made by the Ukrainian Parliament in the face of the strong antiwar positions of major EU players France and Germany and another one of Ukraine's strategic partners – Russia.

On March, 20, 2003, the US and Great Britain began the war against Saddam's Iraq. Baghdad was taken on April 9. But the war has not ended. During the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom it became obvious that victory in this war has not solved the main problem. It has only brought down the Hussein regime and broken and defeated the Iraqi army. Remaining is the postwar reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, industry and entire infrastructure. This basic objective was again addressed by the military, although that is not its primary mission. Their tasks first of all are to protect democracy and security for the Iraqi people, as well as their own security.

The decision to participate as coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Ukrainian government was dictated by time and by the Ukrainian desire to stand together with its main ally, the US. Many politicians recalled what happened in relations between US and Ukraine, as a result of the Kolchuga scandal and Gongadze's murder. The political authority would like to correct all misunderstandings and eliminate frictions in US-Ukraine relations. Both sides reconsidered their expectations and established a new base for developing relations. Actually it has been a very complex process to adopt this decision. In accordance with our constitution, Ukraine may participate only in peacekeeping and peace maintenance operations. This decision must be based on a UN resolution, proposal or request. Another problem which Ukraine had in 2003 was the lack of mass media support. Ukrainian media did not clearly explain to society all the dangers, threats and abuses which were used by Saddam's regime to its Iraqi citizens and neighbors. Public opinion in Ukraine was not prepared as was required to immediately support Parliament. Nevertheless, political leaders and parliament had the courage and wisdom to approve this decision. There was much controversy in the Ukrainian parliament. About what? I want to focus on the political and strategic level adoption of this decision and provide some analysis of its legality in accordance with Ukraine legislation.

The first problem relates to the issue of a mandate. According to the UN statutes, one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law is the principle of justification for the use of force in international relations (Article 2, Point 4). This is the firm basis of international law and the system of international security. The United Nations Charter provides only two exceptions. The first exception provides for the possibility to use force only for the purpose of

maintenance or recovery of peace and safety based on the UN resolution (Article 42 United Nations Charter). The second exception is connected by the national right of a U.N. member to individual or collective self-defense, if aggression against the country occurs (Article 51). In other words, application of force against Iraq would be legitimate only with the presence of a special UN resolution. In reality, neither of these exceptions applied. This had a large resonance at the time of the decision by the Ukrainian government to be a member of the coalition forces. The Ukrainian Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs had a number of deficiencies. They did not give a classical estimation of the legality of the decision adopted in accordance with the United Nations Charter. All of this just stiffened the position of the Ukrainian opposition in the Parliament. The indeterminacy of the legal situation brought in turn numerous debates and contradictions during the decision by the Ukrainian administration to send a military contingent into Iraq. Recently the UN Security Council has called the USA and Great Britain occupation countries. In this case it must be accepted that their troops invaded Iraqi territory as occupation forces.

The Ukrainian Presidential decree indicates that participation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the coalition forces should be for the purpose of the creation of stability and safety in the Republic of Iraq. These forces act in the framework of the Joint Task Forces Command (administration) on the performance of UN Security Council resolution ? 1483. The resolutions have not discussed any coalition (multinational) forces. Secondly, the preliminary corresponding Security Council resolution about creation of peacemaking forces for Iraq, was absent. But all of this was required by Ukrainian law to adopt the correct corresponding decision. All of Ukrainian society had a clear understanding of imperfections of the Ukrainian legislation. All of this gave ground to the Ukrainian opposition (Communists and socialists) to continue debates in the parliament and not to adopt the solution. In terms of the US appeal to the UN Security Council in order to provide more UN authority on the postwar renovation process in Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted resolution # 1546 to solve the problem of the creation of Multinational Forces in Iraq under US leadership. According to this resolution, the Joint Multinational Command should regularly, once every three months, report to the UN Security Council.

Another critical issue for Ukraine is the question of the price of the Ukrainian contingent's presence in Iraq. The global war against terrorism, awarding of contracts to restore infrastructure destroyed by the war and the possibility to recover energy sources, were all arguments by which the Ukrainian Government proved to its citizens the need of our soldiers' presence in Iraq. This decision contributed to a productive normalization of Ukrainian- American relations.

In the beginning, the idea to create a multinational division “Center- south” for Coalition Joint Task Forces Command seemed absolutely unfeasible. More than 20 coalition countries put their personnel and contingents under the Polish command. This all raises questions concerning operational planning, armament, guarantee of logistic supply, etc. It is first of all necessary to solve one of the main questions – multinational interoperability. The selection of the personnel and preliminary combat training of our separate mechanized brigade did create large problems.

Ukraine has participated in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations since May 1992. More than 23,000 officers and soldiers have participated in those missions. So, it was not a great difficulty in completing the selection of skilled and prepared personnel.

It needed only three months to prepare our subdivisions and after that the Ukrainian contingent was fully deployed to Iraq by August 17, 2003. After the previous deployment to Kuwait, this next deployment to Iraq once again proved the ability of the Ukrainians to deploy in a timely manner, relying primarily on their own airlift capability while partly using foreign sealift when necessary. The Americans, who pledged to compensate the Ukrainians for the transportation cost of both deployments—to Kuwait and Iraq—praised this ability. The Ukrainian brigade was to replace the 3rd Marine Battalion at al-Kut, the capital of Wasit province in Iraq, southeast of Baghdad on a 140-km long sector of the Iraqi border with Iran. The substitution was planned to be finished in 2 weeks. During the first week, both Ukraine and the United States had to accomplish missions together. During the second week, only instructors remained on the U.S. side to help Ukrainian personnel adjust. From early September 2003, the Ukrainians assumed full responsibility for Wasit province's peace and order. At the outset, after obtaining the 140-km Iraqi- Iranian border section, we did not prove to be immediately ready to carry out the function of border-guards. It was necessary not only to guard the section border, but also to prevent illegal migration and narcotics transportation. Karbolla City does not have less value as a holy city for Arab- Shiites, than Mecca for all Moslems. The way to Karbolla for the Arab- Shiites exactly lies through the Ukrainian sector of responsibility.

Before Ukrainian deployment into the Middle-East region (Kuwait), we formed and sent our group of officers (liaison team) to make contact with Central Command in Tampa. The excellent interrelation and good coordination of all our actions with CENTCOM has allowed us to avoid many mistakes.

The Ukrainian Army formed and deployed its first brigade in Iraq exclusively with personnel, who earlier had participated in peacekeeping and combat operations. The first leader of our liaison team who was assigned for coordination with CENTCOM was lieutenant- general

V. Kuksenko, who had been a commandant of the combat sector in the time of war in former Yugoslavian republics during the 1990s. The Ukrainian brigade obtained a large sector of responsibility - the whole province of Wasit. Interaction with all Ukrainian power structures, Central Command and additional training, gave us a very rapid result. As a result the preparation of Iraqi frontier-guards and national guards was not problematic. Our contingent for the first time was confronted with civil-military tasks. Not only did brigade soldiers carry out the task to guarantee safety, they also protected law in the province. It was one of the first tasks, and still now guarantees Ukrainian soldiers their protection and safety.

According to Ukrainian participant accounts, as soon as the first elements of the 5th Brigade stepped onto Kuwaiti and then Iraqi soil, U.S. military personnel gave them comprehensive support. The United States helped in the organization of transportation, security, rations, deployment of personnel, and supply of the equipment for the Ukrainian military contingent. At briefings, as well as in everyday communication, the experienced U.S. troops continuously gave practical advice on how to operate in a hot climate, what to be careful of, what to do if someone gets sunstroke, how to maintain communications and orient oneself in an unfamiliar environment, how to act when under attack, etc.

At the Al-Kut airfield, the command of the U.S. Marine battalion, which was to transfer control to the Ukrainian brigade, did everything to ensure that its comrades-in-arms would not be starting from scratch. Almost every day U.S. personnel met with personnel of the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent and transferred their experience in performing their duties. Specifically, the 19th Separate Special Battalion, which was slotted to take over the defense of the Al-Kut airfield, was given complete information about the most dangerous sectors of the perimeter of this large installation. The Marines told the Ukrainians about various incidents that had occurred over the five months since the operation began. They also shared their observations of the behavior of the residents of the city.

The specialists of the Marine engineer unit were just as concerned with the health and lives of the Ukrainians. They collected and displayed a huge exhibit of the explosive devices that had been found on the former military airfield. The U.S. sappers fully characterized each mine, device and grenade, and recounted the story of an unfortunate incident involving two of their soldiers. At some point, Ukrainian and U.S. sappers had to work together to demine the territory of the airfield, which they did with understanding and trust in each other.

The joint cooperation of the Ukrainian and U.S. military, which began with transmission of operational experience, continued after the Marines' departure, when the task of training an Iraqi territorial self-defense battalion was carried out jointly. The Ukrainians were responsible for

selection and medical examination of Iraqi personnel, while training was organized together with U.S. instructors.

Outside the Ukrainian brigade, the officers of the Ukrainian staff element at the higher "Center-South" division headquarters and at the Coalition headquarters, who were working together with Americans, Poles, Spanish, Hungarian and other allies, on many occasions recognized the valuable experience they received during joint peacetime training, joint peacekeeping missions, and at the courses for multinational staff officers in Kiev (National Defense Academy). This experience allowed them to be interoperable with their U.S. partners and other nationals in Iraq.

Regarding the preliminary analysis of the first rotation of the Ukrainian brigade to Iraq, the United States appeared basically satisfied, based on the overall ability of Ukrainians to deploy to the theater of operation and perform the assigned mission. During the second rotation of Ukrainian troops in Iraq, when the 6th Brigade was substituted for the 5th Brigade in February-March 2004, the events in Wasit province, as everywhere in Iraq, took a more dramatic turn. In addition to routine instances of cooperation of U.S. and Ukrainian sappers, medics, logisticians, etc., several combat engagements took place. At the start of clashes with the militia of Shiite cleric Muqtada-al-Sadr, on April 6-7, two Ukrainian mechanized platoons for 2 days defended the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) building at the capital of Wasit province, the city of Al-Kut, and another Ukrainian mechanized platoon defended the bridge over the Tigris River. They withstood a 4-hour long attack by large numbers of Sadr militia and further attempts to blow up the CPA administrative building, as well as continuous mortar and RPG attacks. They suffered one dead and five wounded, while killing over a hundred attackers. Two U.S. F-16s and later two *Apache* helicopters came and left without firing a shot or launching a missile.

The Ukrainian detachment managed to evacuate safely thirty-seven U.S. and six Polish civilian personnel from the siege. It was done at the request of U.S. civilian CPA personnel. Two U.S. Apache helicopters covered the retreat.

Unfortunately, many U.S. newspapers reported the incident in slightly negative tones, as if Ukrainian troops simply abandoned the city of Al-Kut (some 370,000 inhabitants!) to the Sadr militia. In fact, it never was a mission of the lightly armed Ukrainian detachment to hold the city. Their mission was to do exactly what they had done—to provide for security of civilian administration—which they accomplished with tactical brilliance.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell thanked Ukrainian allies in his letter dated April 9, 2004 to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostiantyn Hryshchenko. Powell highly praised the courage and bravery shown by the Ukrainian troops, particularly during the events in Al-Kut. While

retaking control of Al-Kut, the Ukrainian battalion stationed near the city performed a supporting role and later renewed patrolling the city and conducting searches. During the first day, they detained three militiamen pretending to be fire-fighters and discovered a large weapons cache. The other two Ukrainian battalions from the 6th Brigade were not engaged in serious combat: one was doing border guard duty defending the 140-km long border sections with Iran (they also had seizures of large amounts of weapons), and the third battalion was busy with de-mining, patrolling and civic missions.

The attacks on Ukrainian troops in Wasit province continued, and on April 19, a Ukrainian patrol on three armored personnel carriers was attacked by a large group of terrorists, which detonated two roadside bombs and opened fire with RPGs and small arms. The Ukrainians returned fire, killing five and wounding seven. In another similar ambush on April 28, 2004, the Ukrainian patrol was less fortunate, when two Ukrainians died and five were wounded.

During the first year of Ukrainian presence in Iraq, the Ukrainian brigade prepared approximately 1485 Iraqi military personnel for Border Guard and National Police, seized more than 5890 examples of different light infantry weapons, including mortars, RPGs, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher and low range surface-to-air missiles, which saved many lives. Ukrainian military personnel have demined more than 2000 sq. km of Iraqi terrain, destroyed about 30,000 tons of explosive items, disarmed more than 23,000 pieces of live ordnance, conducted more than 1000 military and civilian convoys, provided many humanitarian operations, rebuilt dozens of schools and kindergartens and gave full security support to civil populations during the first national elections on January 30, 2005.

During this time at home, Ukrainian leftists accelerated campaigning on the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Iraq. This campaign, along with the absence of balanced and positive coverage in foreign press, made it more difficult for Ukrainian authorities to explain to the public why Ukrainians were dying in Iraq. Eight Ukrainian officers and soldiers were killed and seventeen were seriously wounded in the Seventy Second Special Battalion, Seventh Brigade on January 9, when they prepared some explosive weapons, mines and aviation bombs for detonation. This last terrorist act just reinforced the Ukrainian Parliament's will to withdraw the contingent from Iraq.

The contingent's participation in the postwar economy, including renovation of the Iraqi water supply, rebuilding schools and kindergartens also had very positive results. Fulfillment of all civil contracts still occurs with clear coordination of actions of the multinational division led by the Polish and through US CENTCOM. But all this concerns the militaries. Let us turn to the role of the Ukrainian government in the Iraqi renovation process. The Ukrainian contingent is already

quite long term in Iraq but not one Ukrainian company has obtained a contract for renovation inside Iraq. In this case Ukraine has large potential. Many civil objects in Iraq during the last 20 - 25 years were built by Ukrainian engineers and specialists. From some points of view, Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs must advance Ukrainian business interests in Iraq, and therefore it is necessary to reexamine national policy.

Our foreign policy course until today in Iraq seems a little erroneous. Traditional Ukrainian domestic business problems of sluggishness and general bureaucracy can lead to failure for Ukrainian plans in postwar Iraq. Even reopening of the Ukrainian Embassy in Iraq in February 2004 has not brought significant improvements. After concentrating on the formation of political conditions for the work of our companies in Iraq we forgot about other elements. This is the participation of our experts in the temporary coalition Administration and in the regional headquarters. These organizations not only contribute to renewal of Iraqi state authority organs but also restoration of civil infrastructure. The presence of Ukrainian experts in these organizations might let Kiev keep track of the situation and have real chances for Ukrainian business to participate in the tenders and contracts. In the summer of 2003, Ukraine, as a coalition country, obtained from the Temporary Coalition Administration in Baghdad a quota for three specialists in the sphere of the natural gas industry and local self-government. So far Ukraine has sent to Iraq only one specialist, Sergey Khanenko. Alone and without real political support, he became simply an administrative clerk.

For its part, the USA repeatedly declared interest in a more international composition of civil specialists. The passage of authority into the hands of the Iraqi Temporary Government Administration did not end its existence. It simply was converted into another organ, where experts preserved its status. This is similar to the case of the advisers in Afghanistan. The same occurred in the headquarters of the regional coalition administration "Center-South", which treated six provinces, including the province of Wasit. The former leader of this administration, Gofeller, many times turned to the Ukrainian government through the Temporary Administration in Baghdad to send civil specialists to Iraq. He needed experts in the sphere of rural economy, power engineering, finances etc. But the Ukrainian side did not answer these requests. If we had our specialists in Iraq, this would allow us to conduct expert estimations of the capabilities for Ukraine in regard to the renovation of the Iraqi economy.

Only in June 2004, the Ukrainian joint enterprise ANHAM signed a contract to delivery military munitions for the Iraqi Army. According to the contract requirement "65% of all ammunitions will be produced in Ukraine and the rest in US, Canada, Great Britain and Romania"¹⁴. Certainly these contracts would not appear very large in comparison with others,

but would open additional possibilities for Ukrainian business. When the Ukrainian side developed the strategy of our presence in Iraq, we concentrated only on the military aspect, like the American side. We left out the civil side of our contingent. I bear in mind special teams to support local authorities. Such teams in Iraq are created by the countries which have had basic contingents in Iraq. These teams should appear as the main coalition administration tools in the process of Iraqi renovation. Only Poland and Spain had such teams in the multinational division. Ukraine, for unknown reasons, did not create an analogous group. Such mistakes in Iraqi policy considerably decrease prospects for Ukrainian business.

CONCLUSION

As far as military lessons for Ukraine are concerned, its military presence in Iraq proves several things. First, years of bilateral military cooperation with the US, Great Britain, Poland, and others were not in vain. They created at least a minimal foundation for joint action. The Ukrainian authorities appeared to be capable of developing the necessary legislative base and capable of making the relevant decisions to send troops, which was not at all automatic.

Regarding Ukraine-US military cooperation, Ukraine and the United States have gone through periods of cautious rapprochement, inflated expectations of "strategic partnership," and sober reevaluation. Ukraine's recent ambitious declaration of intent to become a NATO member was welcomed by the United States, although cautiously, because Ukraine has not been very successful in building a firm democratic foundation and conducting defense reform. An important role in these efforts belongs to military cooperation: within the bilateral military-to-military contacts programs, within NATO partnership events, and through the practical accomplishment of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Most important is that the military field is not attacked by ideological, geopolitical, or cultural differences between Ukraine and the United States.

The history of military cooperation has proven that, despite Ukraine's many political and economic problems, as well as those of a cultural and military nature (bureaucracy and over-centralization, Soviet legacy of equipment and doctrine), certain core interests provide firm ground on which to continue mutually advantageous military cooperation. These core interests are, at their most basic, U.S. willingness to support the preservation of Ukraine's independence as a key to regional security and Ukrainian willingness to cooperate with the United States in fighting terrorism and preserving international peace.

The two countries have developed elaborate cooperative mechanisms, which permit rather effective implementation of joint events. The Ukrainian military appears genuinely to be interested

in this cooperation, is generally technically and intellectually capable, but is still a rather long way from compatibility with U.S. cultural and doctrinal standards. But if we consider the starting point, the results are impressive.

It is exactly in the area of peacekeeping where the United States has needed—and will continue to need—the Ukrainian military the most. Iraq has shown that the U.S. is capable of winning regional wars without decisive support from its allies. But these campaigns also have proved that the United States has significant limits in providing for post-conflict resolution (peacekeeping and peace-building) without support from allies, even those as distant as Ukraine. This is very important, since no war can be considered victorious if the post-war situation deviates too far from prewar objectives.

Ukrainian military cooperation in peacekeeping operations with the U.S. Army might provide more opportunities for as such things as Army reforms or in the security field. In this case we need strong political direction and sufficient fiscal support. We could have done better in developing our own “US specialist”.

In comparison with new NATO members, including Ukraine's neighbor Poland, Ukrainians, as a fighting force, are equal to the Poles. In addition, Ukraine has some unique capabilities which it can provide, such as airlift, missile/space, radars, tanks, CBR-testing and protection equipment, and other high-tech possibilities.

Ukraine, indeed, has many assets to contribute to combined operations with the United States, but the challenge still remains how better to make them interoperable. The results of this study generally point to the need for a two-tier approach to interoperability: the first tier being continued efforts to develop compatible capabilities for low intensity conflict (peacekeeping); the second tier being the identification and improvement of complementary—rather than comparable—capabilities for high intensity conflict.

By deploying a brigade to Iraq, Ukraine raised the level of our cooperation to a new height, which will, in turn, be a new test to the value of peacetime military cooperation. If, despite all conceivable political and military problems, this new level of cooperation is successful, it might open the door for partnership beyond peacekeeping. Ukrainian participation in Iraq is again stepping toward this new geopolitical strategy.

Ukraine is important not only because of the strategic position on the border between Europe and Eurasia but also by virtue of its influence in this region. She is incredibly viable and has enormous potential for growth and development. Ukraine appeared in the epicenter of the strategic rivalry between the West and the East. It should be a cornerstone of foreign policy of the USA - the strategic partner of Ukraine.

The problems in attitudes between the USA and Ukraine naturally affected Ukraine's promotion into the WTO, EU and NATO. Despite some successes, the cooperation between Ukraine and NATO also for some time has run into a condition of permanent, noncommittal consultations. In this regard, the incident with Leonid Kuchma's invitation to Prague, and problems with the format of negotiations are considered also. The coordination of a general Ukraine-NATO Action Plan which was signed during the Prague summit at the session of the NATO-Ukraine Commission scheduled action under a logical stage of cooperation within the framework of the program "Partnership for Peace".

Thus, in the beginning of 2003, Ukraine and the West appeared in a deadlock in attitudes. Fears of the USA and NATO concerning a sharp roll of Ukraine through a deepening of integration projects with Russia, intensified the search for an exit from this deadlock. In Ukraine this search was really significant. The will of the national majority had forced the old system to change to the side of democracies. Ukrainians found the right themselves to define the future. It was not just a change of corrupt authority. It was a completely new factor in the history of Ukraine. Ukraine should be an integral component of the united Euro-Atlantic space, a prosperous democratic state. Now Ukraine not only desires to achieve this, but also has great opportunities.

The new president of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko has declared the choice of the Ukrainian people during his first tour to Europe in January of this year. It is the full integration of Ukraine into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. At some time the cooperation with Russia, Ukrainian historical partner and giant neighbor, will improve and become stronger. This will allow Ukraine not only to achieve the status of a country with a market economy and to enter the WTO, but also to create a free trade zone with the European Union. "We are not neighbors of Europe, we are Europe. But we are neighbors of the European Union. How it will change – is a very important task".¹⁵ Now the Government of Ukraine needs to formulate very precisely all foreign policy for the next 15-20 years. The new strategic orientation of Ukraine will affect not only Ukraine, but also Russia, the European Union and NATO.

Ukraine certainly wants to remain the pragmatic realist, instead of a romantic. European integration is not a one-year question. Now the EU has enough obligations to the already selected new candidates. A precise plan, with a statement of all steps which Ukraine should undertake, is necessary. Only after that can Ukraine's application for membership be accepted. I would like to argue for the Ukrainian intention about fast entry into the EU. But it is a long-term prospect. There is another promising and more realistic possibility for the near perspective for Ukraine – NATO membership.

NATO is that main western organization which is capable not only of providing integration of Ukraine, but also of restoring American and European unity within a foreign policy framework. Certainly Ukrainian – Russian cooperation could deteriorate again. Thus the USA and Europe should precisely let Russia know, that in the nearest future Russia can become a NATO candidate and can play a leading role as well.

Ukraine has the Plan of Action and the annual Target Plan with NATO. In connection with the Ukrainian presidential elections, popular support for NATO membership has fallen. Basically Ukraine has lost one year. Although Russia is against NATO expansion and will counteract this, for the last year Russia on the contrary cooperates with NATO in a wider range.

Ukraine should not build cooperation with the alliance based on possible cooperation with Russia. All will depend on how society will be prepared. Ukraine, at the time of the NATO Istanbul summit in June 2004, was ready to proceed to a new level of cooperation, to the Membership Action Plan - but that has not taken place.

The foreign policy and military-political orientation of Ukraine should be very precisely formulated by the President, the Supreme Commander in Chief. The problem of possible EU membership is not as politicized as cooperation with NATO and possible membership. But it is necessary to understand, that moving to the EU without NATO membership, as the preliminary filter with serious requirements of democratic character, is impossible to reach.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense recently declared the reduction of the military contingent in Iraq by 600-700 persons during the first half of the current year. Of course the Ukrainian contingent's tasks will be changed also. This work proceeds in close consultations with the USA, Poland, Great Britain and the Iraqi authorities. The first one hundred thirty-six Ukrainian servicemen from the seventy second battalion arrived to Ukraine on 15 March 2005. But this problem of the Coalition mission performance and safety in Iraq should not be put under threat.

Ukraine did not use all opportunities in Iraq to promote its national interests. With a hasty contingent withdrawal, Ukraine for a long time loses an opportunity to return to Iraq with other purposes - first of all, economic and energy. Ukraine has an Odessa – Brody pipeline. For its interest the most favorable use is Iraqi oil, an oil pipeline to the Black Sea and farther - on a competitive basis cooperation with Russia to not go further through the Bosphorus. If we leave Iraq now, we leave without realizing this goal.

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